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For nearly eight years, the Nicaraguan question has been the most
heatedly disputed issue of American foreign policy since the end of the
Vietnam War. It has focussed the attention of Congress, which contin-
ues to consider Administration proposals to provide assistance to the
Contras,' and the American and Western press. Nicaragua has brought
aspects of Nicaraguan-American relations before the International Court
of Justice (I.C.J.),2 and Carlos Tiimermann, Nicaragua's Ambassador to
* While this issue was in production, the International Court of Justice held, inter a7ia, by
a vote of 12-3 that the U.S. is violating international law by training and supplying the Contras;
it also rejected by a vote of 12-3, the justification of collective self-defense maintained by the
U.S. See Excerpts From Rulings by the World Court, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
This Feature remains an important part of the record and of the ongoing debate over, as Mr.
Rostow put it in his Article, infra p. 439, "the rules underlying world public order." The
authors of this Feature have seen drafts of each other's pieces to enhance the dialogue.
t Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State. The views
expressed are my own, and are not necessarily those of the United States government.
1. The United States government refers to the Contras as the "Nicaraguan Democratic
Resistance." See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPEC. REP. No. 142,
DOCUMENTS ON THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE: LEADERS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND
PROGRAM 1 (1985) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS ON THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE].
Critics of the Contras tend to support the Nicaraguan government's view that they are "merce-
naries (many of whom served the former dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle)." Tiinnermann,
United States Armed Intervention in Nicaragua and Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
11 YALE J. INT'L L. 104, 105 (1985). See also Memorial of Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1985
I.C.J. Pleadings (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Central America) 3 pas-
sim (Memorial dated Apr. 30, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Memorial]. This Nicaraguan charac-
terization does not withstand scrutiny. See, e.g., S. CHRIsTLAN, NICARAGUA: REVOLUTION
IN THE FAMILY 267-83 (1985) (Contra leadership); DOCUMENTS ON THE NICARAGUAN
RESISTANCE, supra.
2. Nicaragua filed suit against the United States in April 1984, claiming that the United
States had recruited, trained, armed, and directed a mercenary force that carried out attacks
against Nicaraguan citizens and facilities, and that these actions violated the clearest and most
important principles of international law. See Application of Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. Pleadings (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua) (Application
dated Apr. 9, 1984) (U.S. violating U.N. and OAS Charters and customary international law)
[hereinafter cited as Application]. The United States withdrew from the I.C.J. case in January
1985 and has refrained from publishing the memorial on the merits it would have submitted to
the Court. See U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicara-
gua in the International Court of Justice, reprinted in 148 WORLD AFF. 58-60 (1985); Nash,
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the United States, recently summarized his country's case in this Jour-
nal 3 Consciously or unconsciously, participants in the discussion are
also addressing the future of world public order and of American foreign
policy.
The outline of the Nicaraguan-American dispute is clear. As Ambas-
sador Tiinnermann asserted, Nicaragua regards as indisputable that the
United States created a mercenary army in 1981 and, since 1982, unlaw-
fully has used this mercenary army together with its own military intelli-
gence personnel in attacks against the Nicaraguan government. 4 The
United States, on the other hand, asserts that its actions against Nicara-
gua are legally justified under article 51 of the United Nations Charter as
actions of collective self-defense against Nicaragua's unlawful support,
since 1979, for guerrilla groups attempting to overthrow the governments
of El Salvador and Honduras. 5 Nicaraguan officials deny this allegation.
Thus, in an affidavit submitted to the I.C.J., Nicaragua's Foreign Minis-
ter "certiffied] and declare[d]" that
I am aware of the allegations made by the government of the United States
that my government is sending arms, ammunition, communications equip-
ment and medical supplies to rebels conducting a civil war against the gov-
ernment of El Salvador. Such allegations are false, and constitute nothing
more than a pretext for the U.S. to continue its unlawful military and
paramilitary activities against Nicaragua intended to overthrow my govern-
ment. In truth, my government is not engaged, and has not been engaged,
in the provision of arms or other supplies to either of the factions engaged
in the civil war in El Salvador.6
The Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. 438 (1985). See also Reisman, Has the International Court Exceeded its Jurisdiction?, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1986) (troubling aspects of the I.C.J.'s November 1984 decision on juris-
diction and admissibility).
3. Tiinnermann, supra note 1, at 104 (article is based on Memorial, supra note 1).
4. Id. at 105.
5. See, eg., BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPEC. REP. No. 132,
"REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS": SANDINISTA INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA 2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS]. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 51 (inherent right of individual and collective self-defense).
6. Affidavit of Miguel D'Escoto Brockman, at I (sworn to Apr. 21, 1984, Annex B to
Memorial, supra note 1) [hereinafter cited as D'Escoto Affidavit] (copy on file with the Yale
Journal of International Law). Ambassador Tiinnermann wrote:
On a factual level, it must be recognized that the allegations concerning supply and
assistance by Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador are simply untrue. Not surprisingly,
the United States has failed to produce any'credible evidence either before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice or in any public forum to substantiate its allegations.
Tiinnermann, supra note 1, at 130-31.
Vol. 11:437, 1986
Nicaragua Revisited
Ambassador Tiirmermann further argues that, even if the allegations
(which he distorts) were true, Nicaragua would not have violated inter-
national law.7
Nicaragua cannot admit the truth of the United States' allegations
without undermining its case before the I.C.J. That case depends on
Nicaragua's being the victim of unprovoked uses of force. Admitting
that it tries to subvert neighboring governments would amount to admit-
ting that those governments are justified in acting in self-defense and that
other affected governments also have a right to act in collective self-de-
fense. The dispute as to events in Central America and the law applica-
ble to them thus has greater significance than the outcome of a particular
lawsuit, however important. It involves persistent, unresolved conflicts
over the rules underlying world public order and the application of those
rules.
It is important to note that, in the debate about Central America, Nic-
aragua's agents have evidentiary advantages. As a direct result of the
Sandinistas' media controls,8 Americans lack a Nicaraguan equivalent of
the Congressional Record or of a free press reporting Nicaraguan deci-
sions and activities. Nicaraguan officials are less than truthful in their
statements and writings,9 and as a result, are less than helpful to those
seeking to understand the issues debated. On March 25, 1986, for exam-
ple, Nicaragua formally denied that it had sent troops into Honduras
despite evidence to the contrary from the battlefields.10
Fortunately, enough publicly available information exists to permit an
evaluation of events in Central America and arguments about the appli-
cation of international law to them.' The contours of American policy
7. Tiinnermann, supra note 1, at 135. Ambassador Tiinnermann wrote that the United
States alleges that Nicaragua supplies "some conventional arms to the insurgents." Id. This
statement is false. See REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 2 (Nicaragua
engages in major effort to overthrow government of El Salvador by supplying arms, training,
and operational direction to Salvadoran guerrillas, and has used its own security personnel in
support of guerrillas fighting the governments of Honduras and Costa Rica).
8. See, e.g., S. CHRISTIAN, supra note 1, at 171-72 (1980 decrees restricting press free-
dom); Ruiz, Nicaragua: What Censorship is Really Like, Wash. Post, May 6, 1986, at A19, col.
1 (author is managing editor of Managua daily La Prensa).
9. For example, Ambassador Tiinnermann recently wrote that "Nicaragua is a nonaligned
nation and votes solidly with the nonaligned countries in the United Nations." Letter from
Carlos Tiinnermann B., N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1986, at A20, col. 3. On the contrary, as John
Norton Moore noted, Nicaragua voted for unified Soviet-Cuban positions 96% of the time in
1983-84. Moore, The Secret War in CentralAmerica and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 43, 52-53 (1986).
10. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
11. See generally Moore, supra note 9; S. CHRisTIAN, supra note 1; REVOLUTION BEYOND
OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, and the published documents and United States government
reports cited therein. Memorial, supra note 1, shows how bountiful is the documentation of
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are well-known. 12 What we know about Nicaraguan policy decisions de-
rives in considerable part from accounts by former members of the
Sandinista government who participated either in making decisions or in
implementing them. Information about Nicaraguan activities also comes
from investigative reporting by journalists; testimony by defectors from
Nicaragua's armed forces, other bodies, and Salvadoran guerrilla
groups;1 3 guerrillas and weapons captured in El Salvador and Honduras;
documents seized in Grenada in 1983;14 and intelligence gathered by the
United States.15
American policy towards Central America. The bulk of Nicaragua's evidence consists of state-
ments made by Administration officials and by Congressmen and Senators, and articles pub-
lished in American newspapers.
12. See, e.g., BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAiRs, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No.
797, SECRETARY SHULTZ, NICARAGUA: WILL DEMOCRACY PREVAIL? (1986); Central
America, Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 608 (Apr. 27, 1983).
13. On the value of defector testimony, the following exchange between Judge Schwebel
and David MacMichael, a witness for Nicaragua, is instructive:
Q. [Schwebel]: Now you spoke before of that famous incident in which the United
States came forward with a defector who was introduced as someone who would testify to
Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran insurgency and, in fact, he did not, and he testi-
fied, in fact, that it was not so, and that he was put up to saying so, and so on. Is that
correct?
A. [MacMichael]: That is true.Q.: What became of that gentleman may I ask?
A.: He is, to m' knowledge, in Nicaragua today.
Q.: I see. He wasn't shot on the spot? He showed no signs of torture? He walked away
as a free man? He was in Nicaragua welcomed as a hero. Is that not correct?
A.: I do not know, Your Honor, as to whether he showed any signs of torture. I had no
chance to examine him physically. I will accept and glory in the fact, as you do, that
people who appear in the custody of the United States Government, in the United States
of America, under guarantees given by that government, find those guarantees respected
and in his case they were.Q.: Right, now given his example, do you see any reason why a defector from the Salva-
doran insurgency should fear to speak the truth? They can well see that if they come out
with a story contrary to that which one would suppose the United States would want
them to hear [sic] would await them as a hero's welcome in Nicaragua? So why wouldn't
they speak the truth?. .. [A]s you know there are a large number of defectors both from
Salvadoran and Nicaraguan sources whose testimony is similar to that of the nature I
have cited to you. I could go on and on giving you examples like this, but I do not think
we can use the time of the Court. My point is simply, that, is not this single example of
the treatment of that single captive suggestive of the fact that persons in the custody of the
United States need not fear to speak the truth as they know it? Wculd that not be the
lesson you would draw if you were in a similar situation?
A.: I certaialy believe that is the case.
1985 I.C.J. Oral Arguments and Documents (Verbatim Record (uncorrected) CR 85/21, Sept.
16, 1986, at 46-47) [hereinafter cited as Verbatim Record amd identified by CR number and
date] (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
14. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, GRENADA DOCUMENTS (1984).
15. The U.S. government may not reveal information derived from secret sources witlout
compromising those sources as well as the government's intelligence capabilities.
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I. Nicaragua at the Center of Conflict, 1979-1985
The State Department has written that, with regard to the conflicts in
Central America, the United States and Nicaragua agree about the law,
not the facts. 16 Whatever the import of the first part of this statement,
the debate about Central America concerns facts; one relevant set in-
volves Nicaragua's foreign policy since the Sandinistas came to power in
1979.
A. Support for Revolution in Central America 17
Critics of United States policy towards Nicaragua tend to slide over, or
ignore, evidence of Nicaragua's support for revolutionary activity in El
Salvador and Honduras.18 Members of the Sandinista National Libera-
tion Front (FSLN) have not been so discreet. At a meeting September
21-23, 1979, the National Directorate of the FSLN adopted An Analysis
of the Situation and Tasks of the Sandinista People's Revolution,19 which,
among other things, set out the Sandinista's foreign policy principles.
16. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 1.
17. For purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to attempt a history of Nicaragua's
relations with its neighbors, even were such a history presently possible to write. The
following discussion aims only to outline such relations for purposes of examining the
application of generally recognized principles of international law to events in Central
America. Nor is it necessary for purposes of this Article's analysis to elaborate on Nicaraguan
violations of human rights and the professed values of the international community. In this
connection, see Moore, supra note 9, at 49-54, 118-21 (Sandinista National Liberation Front
tyranny); S. CHRISTIAN, supra note 1, at 202-66, 290, 299 (Sandinista dealings with the
church, merchants, farmers, Miskito Indians, and the press); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No.
9467, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA UNDER THE SANDINISTAS (1986).
18. See, e.g., Foley, Contra Aid: An Act of War, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986, at A17, col. 2
(U.S. policy a prescription for undeclared proxy war; scant mention of Nicaraguan policy);
Schlesinger, Bay of Pigs Again-Only Worse, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1986, at 28, col. 1 (Reagan
Doctrine will lead to commitment to endless foreign wars; no mention of Nicaraguan policy).
The United States government has published evidence of Nicaraguan support for insurgency in
El Salvador, and Honduras. See, e.g., BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
SPEC. REP. No. 80, COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR (1981) [hereinafter cited
as SPEC. REP. No. 80]; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR:
DOCUMENTS DEMONSTRATING COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY,
DOCS. E, F, G, H, I (1981) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS]; REVOLUTION BEYOND.OUR
BORDERS, supra note 5. For a criticism of SPEC. REP. No. 80, supra, as faling to support the
government's conclusions, see Caldeira, Responding to the Crisis in El Salvador: A Public Or-
der Perspective, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 325, 348 (1982), which summarizes press criti-
cism of the Report. Caldeira neither discusses nor cites the State Department's rebuttal. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, RESPONSE TO STORIES PUBLISHED IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL AND
THE WASHINGTON POST ABOUT SPECIAL REPORT No. 80 (1981) (on file with the Yale Jour-
nal of International Law).
19. COORDINATOR FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, "THE 72-HOUR DOCUMENT": THE SANDINISTA BLUEPRINT FOR
CONSTRUCTING COMMUNISM IN NICARAGUA, A TRANSLATION (1986).
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The foreign policy of the Sandinista People's Revolution is based on the full
exercise of national sovereignty and independence and the principle of revo-
lutionary internationalism. The objective of the FSLN's foreign policy is to
achieve the consolidation of the Nicaraguan revolution as this will help to
strengthen the Central American, Latin American, and world revolution.
The consolidation must be achieved through the solution of the military
and economic problems, principally because with the solution of the first we
are strategically preparing to repel any aggression and with the second we
can make headway in severing the ties of economic dependence on North
American imperialism. This concept will govern our foreign policy as ex-
pressed in the following guidelines:
a) Develop political and diplomatic relations which will strengthen our
process of military consolidation and economic independence.
b) Stimulate and strengthen the formulation of a national anti-imperialist
and democratic policy, both internationally as well as on the continental
level, and in the Caribbean area in particular.
c) Contribute to and promote the struggle of the peoples of Latin America
against fascist dictatorships [and] for democracy and national liberation.
d) In the Central American region, because of its immediate strategic
value, the same principles will apply, emphasizing the need to neutralize,
through the proper handling of their internal contradictions, the aggressive
policies of the military dictatorships of Guatemala and El Salvador and the
differentiation with the special situation in Honduras and the friendly con-
duct of Costa Rica and Panama. 20
Nicaragua's support for guerrillas fighting the government of El Salvador
is the kind of activity that gives practical meaning to these principles.
Four days after Somoza's departure in July 1979, FSLN leaders in
Managua discussed providing assistance to Salvadoran guerrillas. In
part, the Sandinistas wanted to repay Salvadoran guerrillas for their help
20. Id. at 13-14. This long document sets forth the FSLN goals in 1979 to consolidate
power by using temporary alliances and coercion to remove non-Marxists from positions of
political and economic power in Nicaragua, id. at 5-6. The strategy was adopted at a time
when the United States, having tried to assist a peaceful transition from Somoza to a new
government, was supplying emergency assistance to meet Nicaragua's reconstruction needs.
In 1979, the United States provided $48 million in aid to Nicaragua. In November 1979, the
Carter Administration proposed supplemental emergency assistance of $75 million to Nicara-
gua. Assistance to Central America and the Caribbean: Hearings Before the Committee on
Foreign Relations on S. 2102 to Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to Authorize Assist-
ance in Support of Peaceful and Democratic Processes of Development in Central America, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 77-80 (1979) (statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dec. 7, 1979), reprinted in AMERICAN FOR-
EIGN POLICY: BAsIc DOCUMENTS 1977-1980, at 1335, 1337 (1983). In 1980, Congress ap-
proved the proposal, but conditioned expenditure on the President's certifying that' Nicaragua
was not aiding or abetting acts of violence or terrorism in other countries. Special Central
American Assistance Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-257, § 536(g), 94 Stat. 422 (1980); to amend
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 533(f), 75 Stat. 424 (1980).
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during the uprising against Somoza. 21 Unity among the various Salvado-
ran guerrilla groups, however, was necessary if they were to topple the
Salvadoran government. Castro encouraged such unity in 1979 and
1980. Thus pressed by Castro, Salvadoran guerrilla groups formed the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) as an umbrella or-
ganization.22 Nicaragua henceforth became a central part of the multi-
lateral network providing arms, training, and other support to the
FMLN in El Salvador.
Disorder in El Salvador tempted the guerrillas and their supporters to
plan for a victory analogous to the overthrow of Somoza. In 1980, Salva-
doran Communist Party leader Jorge Shafik Handal embarked on an ex-
tended trip to Communist and other countries in search of arms.23 The
arms and supplies were sent to Salvadoran guerrillas by way of Cuba and
Nicaragua. They began to arrive in Cuba and Nicaragua in September
and October 1980, and in El Salvador by land, sea, and air from Mana-
gua during the same period.24 Nicaragua dismissed American diplo-
matic protests against its assistance to Salvadoran guerrillas. Nicaraguan
officials said that some of their colleagues may have assisted Salvadoran
guerrillas, but that the government disapproved of such activity and had
taken steps to end it.25
21. See Le Moyne, The Guerrilla Network, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at
70-71.
22. See id. at 70; REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5; SPEC. REP. No. 80,
supra note 18, at 6.
23. Moscow referred him to Vietnam, where he received commitments to supply weapons,
mainly American. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 5-6. According to
William Shawcross, Colonel Bui Tin, deputy editor of the Vietnamese People's Army newspa-
per, acknowledged in 1981 that Vietnam shipped weapons left by American forces to Salvado-
ran guerrillas: "It's not fair to say the US can help the junta but we cannot help our friends.
We do our best to support revolutionary movements in the world. We don't have to ask
permission from Washington." Shawcross, In a Grim Country, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Sept. 24,
1981, at 65. Documents captured by Salvadoran security forces and published in this country,
and serial numbers on M-16s captured in El Salvador and Honduras traced to weapons left by
American forces in Vietnam show that Vietnam agreed to ship some 60 tons of arms to Nicara-
gua for transshipment to Salvadoran guerrillas in June 1980. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR
BORDERS, supra note 5, at 46. Czechoslovakia also promised weapons; East Germany, medi-
cal supplies. Id. at 6.
24. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 6-7.
25. Id. at 7, 21 (summarizing classified diplomatic correspondence); D'Escoto Affidavit,
supra note 6, at 1 (Nicaragua intercepted busload of arms destined for El Salvador). See also
Letter from Ambassador Carlos Arguello, Nicaragua's agent to the I.C.J., to the Registrar of
the I.C.J. (Nov. 26, 1985) (written response to questions posed by the Court) (copy on file with
the Yale Journal of International Law):
As the Government of Nicaragua has consistently stated, it has never supplied arms or
other material assistance to insurgents in El Salvador or sanctioned the use of its territory
for such purposes, it has never permitted Salvadoran insurgents to establish a headquar-
ters or operations base or command and control facility in Nicaraguan territory and has
never permitted its territory to be used for training of Salvadoran insurgents.
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Despite official denials, evidence of Nicaraguan support for the FMLN
accumulated in late 1980 and early 1981. In April 1981, for example,
Honduran security forces intercepted a truck containing arms-includ-
ing M-16s from Vietnam-and ammunition en route to El Salvador.26
American photoreconnaissance showed the improvement of the
Papalonal (Nicaragua) airstrip in 1980 to accommodate cargo aircraft.
In January 1981, transport planes from Papalonal dropped supplies to
guerrillas in southeastern El Salvador. A small plane crashed in El Sal-
vador. Weapons were captured. The pilot said the flight and arms cargo
originated in Managua. 27
In addition to shipping arms to Salvadoran guerrillas, Nicaragua pro-
vided headquarters, training, and operational guidance. The FMLN
headquarters were near Managua from 1981 to late 1983, and Cuban and
Nicaraguan advisers there trained guerrillas for war and planned and di-
rected specific operations. To prepare for the December 30, 1983, attack
on El Salvador's 4th Brigade headquarters, for example, a model of the
base was constructed in Cuba and FMLN troops practiced assaults
against it. The weapons used in the actual attack were shipped through
Nicaragua.28
At the beginning of 1981, the FMLN attempted to seize control of El
Salvador by a "final offensive." Nicaragua scarcely veiled its support.
On January 10, 1981, a "secret" radio station in Nicaragua announced
that "the decisive hour has come."'29 After the FMLN achieved ini-
tial successes, Radio Managua announced victories achieved "by our
forces."'30 Despite the FMLN's widespread attacks, the final offensive
failed to unseat El Salvador's government. It did, however, provoke
President Carter, in his last days in office, to send military assistance to
El Salvador for the first time since 1977.31
Since January 1981, the FMLN has continued to receive assistance,
including weapons, training, and direction from Nicaragua and Soviet
bloc states. Information about the flow of arms, however, has been spo-
radic. It in part depends on captures in the field. The State Department
believes that the FSLN adjusts its deliveries depending on the temper of
American politics, as well as on the needs of the guerrillas. After the
26. Customs Seizes Van with Arms at Nicaraguan Border, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service [hereinafter cited as FBIS] (Lat. Am.), Apr. 10, 1981, at 10 (Tegucigalpa, Honduras,
Radio America, Apr. 9, 1981); REVOLUIroN BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 9.
27. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 8.
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id.




Grenada operation in October 1983, for example, Nicaragua reduced its
assistance, possibly from fear that the United States would take military
action against the Managua government.32
Nicaraguan officials have implicitly and explicitly admitted that Nica-
ragua supports guerrillas fighting the government of El Salvador. In July
1981, for example, FSLN Directorate member Bayardo Arce told the
American charge d'affaires in Managua that "the United States 'had bet-
ter realize that nothing you can say or do will ever stop us from giving
our full support to our fellow guerrillas in El Salvador.' -33 On July 19,
1983, Nicaragua's Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega called for an end to
outside assistance to both sides of the Salvadoran conflict, thus acknowl-
edging Nicaraguan aid to the guerrillas. 34
Though focussing their energy on El Salvador, which in 1979 appeared
a promising place for successful revolution, Nicaragua and Cuba have
supported guerrillas operating in other Central American states as well.
Honduras has been an especially important target.35 Honduras is the
overland route from Nicaragua to El Salvador and the home to groups of
armed opponents of the Sandinista regime. The Sandinistas collaborate
with Honduran revolutionary groups to maintain a network for shipping
arms to El Salvador. They also provide arms, training, and advice to
32. Id. at 12. In 1985, a defector from the FMLN's largest constituent group said that his
group received 50 tons of material every three months from Nicaragua before the Grenada
operation. Id. at 11. See also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON
CENTRAL AMERICA 116 (1984).
Fears of American military action seem to have dissipated, although the FSLN tries to
encourage them. In any event, fear of the United States has not imposed changes on the FSLN
program as outlined in 1979. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. For example, in May
1984, Bayardo Arce, a member of the Sandinista National Directorate, explained to the Polit-
ical Committee of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party:
Imperialism asks three things of us: to abandon interventionism, to abandon our strategic
ties with the Soviet Union and the socialist community, and to be democratic. We cannot
cease being internationalists unless we cease being revolutionaries.
We cannot discontinue strategic relationships unless we cease being revolutionaries. It is
impossible even to consider this.
Yet the superstructure aspects, democracy as they call it, bourgeois democracy, has an
element which we can manage and even derive advantages from for the construction of
socialism in Nicaragua. What are those advantages, what is it we explained to the party
leadership? The main thing about the elections, as far as we are concerned, is the drafting
of the new constitution. That is the important thing. The new constitution will allow us
to shape the juridical and political principles for the construction of socialism in
Nicaragua.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9422, INTER-AMERICAN SERIES 118, COMMANDANTE
BAYARDO ARCE's SECRET SPEECH BEFORE THE NICARAGUAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSN) 4-5
(1985).
33. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 23 n.23.
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. at 13-14.
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various guerrilla groups in Honduras.3 6 Thus supported, Honduran
guerrillas tried in 1983 and 1984 to establish bases in isolated provinces
of Honduras, but Honduran security forces prevented success. Nicara-
guan efforts to train and arm guerrillas in Honduras nevertheless contin-
ued in 1985. 37 Starting three days after the Sandinistas came to power
and continuing to the present, Nicaragua has conducted hundreds of
raids into Honduras and has mined both sides of the border.38
B. Testimony at the International Court of Justice
Those who testified on behalf of Nicaragua at the I.C.J.'s hearings in
September 1985 corroborated the essence of the story of Nicaragua's sup-
port for Salvadoran insurgents. Nonetheless, denials that Nicaragua sup-
ports, or has ever supported, such insurgents permeates Nicaragua's
formal presentations to the I.C.J. in the case against the United States,
Ambassador Tiinnermann's article, and other Nicaraguan government
statements.3 9 Nicaraguan unwillingness to discuss either the details of
Nicaraguan foreign policy or the evidence of Nicaragua's support for
36. See id. at 14; Moore, supra note 9, at 59. Despite Nicaraguan assistance, armed groups
fighting the Honduran government have not been particularly successful, although they have
carded out attacks on government buildings, and engaged in hostage-taking and aircraft hi-
jacking. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 13-14.
37. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 15.
38. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A6, col. 4 (noting attack of May 1985 and previous
raids); U.S. Newsman Killed in Nicaraguan Attack, FBIS (Lat. Am.), June 22, 1983, at 16
(Tegucigalpa, Honduras Domestic Service, June 22, 1983); REVOLtTiON BEYOND OUR BOR-
DERS, supra note 5, at 15. Nicaragua also supports insurgents in Costa Rica and Guatemala.
See REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 16-18 (Costa Rica); Moore, supra
note 9, at 58-60 (Guatemala and Costa Rica).
39. Nicaragua's submissions to the I.C.J. contradict the direct testimony of its witnesses.
For example, Nicaragua's principal government witness denied that Nicaragua supported
guerrillas in other countries or in any way violated the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of its neighbors. See Verbatim Record, CR 85/20 (Sept. 13, 1985), supra note 13, at 16
(testimony of Vice-Minister of the Interior Luis Carrion). Documents submitted by Nicaragua
to support its claim include congressional findings that Nicaragua supports insurgencies in
neighboring states and newspaper articles referring to such support. For example, one of Nica-
ragua's documentary submissions is the May 1983 report of the House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The Committee reported that:
At the time of the filing of this report, the Committee believes that the intelligence avail-
able to it continues to support the following judgments with certainty:
A major portion of the arms and other material sent by Cuba and other communist
countries to the Salvadoran insurgents transits Nicaragua with the permission and assist-
ance of the Sandinistas.
The Salvadoran insurgents rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua, some of which are
located in Managua itself, for communications, command-and-control, and for the logis-
tics to conduct their financial, material and propaganda activities.
The Sandinista leadership sanctions and directly facilitates all of the above functions.
Nicaragua provides a range of other support activities, including secure transit of insur-




insurgencies in other countries is intentional and indispensable to Nicara-
gua's legal case; that case would collapse if Nicaragua conceded that it
was assisting an insurrection against the government of El Salvador and
had been doing so for more than two years before the date that it alleges
the United States began supporting the opponents of the FSLN. Both
formal statements of international law and the existing pattern of state
practice make clear that providing arms and other help to insurgents
constitutes an armed attack against the government confronting the in-
surgency. Efforts at individual and collective self-defense against such
attack may include incursions into the state providing-such help.
A central figure in Ambassador Tiinnermann's article and in Nicara-
gua's presentation of evidence to the I.C.J. is David MacMichael, a con-
tract employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from March 1981 to
April 1983. Ambassador Tiinnermann describes MacMichael as writing
and testifying that "the Administration and the CIA have systematically
misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in the supply of arms to Salva-
doran guerrillas to justify its efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan govern-
ment."' 4 Yet, under questioning by Judge Stephen Schwebel of the
I.C.J., MacMichael admitted that the evidence inclined him "towards
ruling 'in' " that Nicaragua had armed Salvadoran guerrillas for the final
offensive of January 1981.41 As the following exchange shows, Nicara-
gua's star witness could not support Nicaragua's claim to be the innocent
victim of American policy.
Q. [Judge Schwebel]: Have you [MacMichael] heard of an airfield in Nic-
aragua at Papalonal, or an airstrip?
HousE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON AMENDMENT TO THE
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983, H.R. REP. No. 122, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983), submitted as Annex E, Attachment 1, to Memorial, supra note 1.
Newspaper articles emphasizing what Nicaragua wanted to show also reported Nicaraguan
support for insurgencies in other countries in Central America. See id. Annex F; Senate Con-
ducts Its Own Probe of Latin Unrest, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1982, at Al, col. 1 (briefing showed
Sandinista involvement in Salvadoran insurgency); A Lot of Show, but No Tell, TIME, Mar. 22,
1982, at 21 (evidence of Sandinista support for insurgents in El Salvador classified; Sol Li-
nowitz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and William P. Rogers found it convincing); Nicaraguan Aid
Called Not Vital to Salvadorans, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1983, at Al, col. 1 (Nicaraguan aid not
sole source of arms used by insurgents); U.S. Seeks Increase in Covert Activity in Latin
America, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1983, at Al, col. 6 (beginning in 1981, aid to Contras to prevent
arms shipments from Nicaragua to Salvadoran rebels); Salvador Rebels Reported to Get Little
Arms Aid, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1983, at Al, col. 5 (conflicting reports as to extent of arms
shipments to Salvadoran rebels from outside country in 1983; State Department asserted deliv-
eries recently increased); Nicaraguan Army: 'War Machine' or Defender of a Besieged Nation?,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at Al, col. 2 (many Administration critics convinced Nicaragua
supplies Salvadoran guerrillas).
40. Tiinnermann, supra note 1, at 131.
41. Verbatim Record, CR 85/21 (Sept. 16, 1985), supra note 13, at 29 (testimony of David
MacMichael).
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A.: Yes, I have.
Q.: Are you aware of the fact that the United States Government under
the Carter Administration made representations to the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment about the use of that airfield as a principle staging area for the
airlift of arms to insurgents in El Salvador?
A.: Yes, I recall that very well.
Q.: In an interview with the Washington Post published on 30 January
1981, the outgoing Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, stated that arms
and supplies being used in El Salvador's bloody civil war were flown from
Nicaragua "certainly with the knowledge and to some extent the help of
Nicaraguan authorities." Now as you know the Administration for which
Mr. Muskie spoke had given more than $100 million in aid to the
Sandinista Government since it took power.
A.: That is correct.
Q.: More than the United States had given Nicaragua under the Somozas
in more than 40 years. Do you think that Mr. Muskie was speaking the
truth?
A.: Oh yes, in that case. For example, I spoke earlier under direct ques-
tioning from Mr. Chayes [counsel for Nicaragua] regarding information
that had existed for that period-late 1980 to very early 1981-and when I
mentioned defectors I had in mind as a matter of fact some persons who
testified under interrogation-I should not say testified-but who stated
under interrogation following their departure from Nicaragua that they had
assisted in the operations out of Papalonal in late 1980 and very early 1981,
and as I say, I am aware of this; there was also an interception of an aircraft
that had departed there-that had crashed or was unable to take off again
from El Salvador where it had landed-and I think that was in either very
early January or late December 1980 and this was the type of evidence to
which I referred, which disappeared afterwards.
Q.: I understand you to be saying, Mr. MacMichael, that you believe that
it could be taken as a fact that at least in late 1980/early 1981 the Nicara-
guan Government was involved in the supply of arms to the Salvadoran
insurgency. Is that the conclusion I can draw from your remarks?
A.: I hate to have it appear that you are drawing this from me like a nail
out of a block of wood, but, yes, that is my opinion.42
Whatever the decision of the I.C.J.,4 3 the problem of transnational
subversion and its place in international law win remain. If the Court
42. Id. at 40-41. Judge Schwebel's questions also put Nicaragua's other witnesses on the
defensive and created an impression that theirs was not the whole story, or even a relevant part
of it. See Verbatim Record CR 85/20 (Sept. 13, 1985), supra note 13, at 13-20 (Schwebel's
questioning of Luis Carrion); CR 85/21 (Sept. 16, 1983), at 67-71 (Schwebel's questioning of
Michael Glermon); CR 85/22 (Sept. 17, 1985), at 30-33 (Schwebel's questioning of Father
Loifon); CR 85/23 (Sept. 17, 1985), at 19-28 (Schwebel's questioning of Nicaraguan Minister
of Finance William Hupper). See also Moore, supra note 9, at 66-69.
43. The I.C.J. may not render default judgments. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JusncE art. 53, para. 2 (I.C.J. must satisfy itself as to jurisdiction, facts, and law




decides, for example, that Nicaragua supports insurgencies in other
countries, that such support is unlawful under international law, and that
support for the FSLN's opponents and the 1984 mining of Nicaraguan
harbors constitute lawful measures of collective self-defense (a conclu-
sion arguably outside the competence of the Court to reach44), it is most
unlikely that Nicaragua will change its policy. Managua denies it is en-
gaging in any such activity. If, on the other hand, the Court holds for
Nicaragua, the situation in Central America will not change. Rather,
such a decision would encourage Nicaragua and other states to increase
their support of insurgencies. Such a result would greatly increase the
risk of general conflict by freeing states from legal obstacles to supporting
insurgencies in other countries.
II. International Law and the Use of Force
World public order is impossible without generally recognized and
respected rules regarding the international use of force. Those rules are
rooted in the nature of the world system of states; 45 and contemporary
international law, especially the U.N. Charter, mirrors the structure of
world politics.
A. Use of Force Under the U.N. Charter: Basic Principles
The U.N. Charter reflects the structure of world public order, for al-
most all states are members of the U.N. Membership in the U.N. is open
only to "peace-loving states;" 46 the law articulated in the Charter codi-
fied rules to govern state behavior generally.
The major premise of the Charter system is the sovereign equality of
states.47 Thus, the Charter's most important prescription prohibits the
use or threat of force by states against the territorial integrity or political
independence of other states except in the exercise of the inherent right,
which "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair," of individual or
collective self-defense against "armed attack. ' 48 The Charter qualifies
44. The United States argued, and the I.C.J. rejected the argument, that the U.N. Charter
grants the Security Council alone the power to restrict an exercise of the right of self-defense in
connection with the exercise of its responsibility to maintain peace and security. 1984 I.C.J.
392, 436 (Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of Nov. 26). See also Reisman, supra
note 2.
45. Cf. Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, in OEUVRES COMPLP-TES 530 (1964) ("Laws, in
their widest meaning, are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things ..
(translation by author).
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1.
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
48. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
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this right by reference to measures to maintain peace and security which
the Security Council might take. In the absence of Security Council ac-
tion, the Charter makes clear, states are not powerless to protect them-
selves.49 The system of states dictates these principles, which proclaim
the only rules consistent with such a structure of world politics. How-
ever open to abuse and confusion, 50 these principles shape international
relations; they also influence the terms by which states justify their uses
of force.
The Charter's rules create the standard against which to judge interna-
tional uses of force. A different standard, one making the lawfulness of a
use of force dependent on the constitution or functioning of a particular
government, for example, would invite even more abuse than do articles
2(4) and 51. Under such a regime, no state would be safe. The logic of a
state system also dictates that, if a state supports a rebellion against the
authority of a government of another state, it is engaging in coercion
against that state. Such coercion may amount to an armed attack.51 The
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
Article 51 provides, in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security."
49. See, eg., L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 345 (3d ed. 1969); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force By Individual States in
International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 455, 498 (1952).
50. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 190-96 (1961) (various kinds of coercion that may constitute armed attack).
51. See Waldock, supra note 49, at 496-98; Moore, supra note 9, at 82-85; I. BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 373 (1963); M. McDOUGAL & F.
FELICIANO, supra note 50, at 232-41; E. Rostow, Book Review, 82 YALE L.J 829 (1973)
(reviewing J.N. MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR (1972)). The literature on inter-
vention constitutes a substantial body of learning, much of it informed by the debates over the
legality under international law of United States involvement in the Vietnam War. See, e.g.,
Friedmann, Intervention and International Law I, in INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 40 (L. Jaquet ed. 1971); Higgins, Intervention and International Law, in INTERVEN-
TION IN WORLD POLITICS 29 (H. Bull ed. 1984); ESSAYS ON INTERVENTION (R. Stanger ed.
1964); R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1970). These and other
works wrestle with the question of the lawfulness of supporting one side in a civil war or
insurgency. Some argue that the justice of the cause determines the permissibility of the inter-
vention. See the discussion in Higgins, supra. Others argue that, in a civil war, a state may
support one side once another state has taken steps to support the other. Such positions equate
the legal position of the government with the rebellion. See generally Wright, Subversive Inter-
vention, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 521 (1960); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 659-60 (H.
Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1953); W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 265-74 (1964) (concludes that law is unsettled). These discussions strive to artic-
ulate a sensible rule for guidance in situations of domestic disturbance. Most dislike the notion
that a government may, as a matter of law, call on the assistance of another state to suppress a
revolution, as Metternicht's Austria did in 1848. In civil war, where does sovereignty repose?
Ultimately, the question of intervention resolves itself into one of prudence. See generally W.
FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 265-74;
Moore, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR
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authors of the U.N. Charter had this reality firmly in mind. The inter-
war period had provided ample evidence of governments' ingenuity in
disguising armed attack in the language of self-defense-what we now
call humanitarian intervention52 -and self-determination.5 3 These ex-
amples informed the thinking at the San Francisco Conference in 1945.54
Conscious of this history, the Charter's drafters intended article 51 to
accommodate regional security treaties to the Charter, not to narrow the
customary law regarding the right to use force in self-defense.55
Self-defense is a narrower concept than self-preservation.5 6 It derives
its meaning from the totality of the circumstances giving rise to the ac-
tion taken in self-defense, that is, "[tlhe expectations which the contend-
ing participants create in each other."57 These expectations "are a
function not only of the simple fact that the military instrument has or
has not been overtly used but also of the degree and the kind of use to
which all other instrumentalities of policy are being put." 58 Because of
IN THE MODERN WORLD 3 (J. N. Moore ed. 1974); Schachter, The United Nations and Inter-
nal Conflict, in LAw AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 401 (J. N. Moore ed. 1974).
As with so many international legal and political questions, the decision to intervene depends
on the stakes and the dangers. In the case of the American Civil War, the North's success on
the battlefield and undoubted readiness to wage war against any state assisting the South en-
couraged neutrality. Similarly, fear of general conflict played an important role in the Western
powers' decision not to intervene in the Spanish Civil War. Few would contest now, as then,
the legal right of states to have supported the republican government of Spain against Franco,
and the forces of Germany and Italy. Then, as now, ideology played its part. In the present
configuration of world politics, where groups of states regard others as deserving destruction as
a matter of morality, if not of law, one should hesitate to espouse a rule that encourages the
states to subvert regimes merely because they dislike their constitution or internal politics.
See, ag., Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Addi-
tional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 124-34 (1985) (Geneva Protocol I would confer
combatant status on guerrillas fighting colonial or racist regimes or alien domination). Ulti-
mately, all states share an interest in the right to exist qua state. And most states are poten-
tially vulnerable to dissension that could become insurgency if outside support were
legitimated.
52. See generally M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 238-42 (1980) (humanitarian intervention consistent with article 2(4)
if it serves community values).
53. For example, Germany claimed that it invaded Poland in 1939 in self-defense. The
Soviet Union advanced the same justification for its 1939 invasion of Finland. In 1938-39,
Hitler claimed to be saving the German-speaking Czech citizens of the Sudetenland from op-
pression. He considered Germany to be assisting Franco in protecting Spain from communism
as well as liberating it from the decadent corruptions of republican government, and claimed
that the Anschluss with Austria constituted self-determination. Mussolini, at times, justified
the invasion of Ethiopia as necessary to civilize a barbarian state. One could add to the list.
54. L. GOODRICH, IS. HAMBRO & A. SIMONs, supra note 49, at 2-3.
55. See. eg., D. BowETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (1958); M. MC-
DOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 50, at 235; Moore, supra note 9, at 83; Waldock, supra
note 49, at 503.04.
56. See Waldock, supra note 49, at 461.
57. M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 50, at 241.
58. Id.
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the risk of abuse, the test for the lawfulness of a use of force in self-
defense against another state is high, as has been well-established for over
a century.5 9 Inevitably, the issue turns on the purpose of the use of force;
a lawful use of force affirms legal rights. 60
Under the U.N. Charter, states not only are barred from unlawfully
using or threatening to use force in their international relations, but also
are responsible for uses of force originating from their territories about
which they had known and should have tried to prevent. In an early
application of this principle, Great Britain was required to pay damages
to the United States for the depredations of a Confederate cruiser that
had been constructed in Britain and allowed to sail despite American
urgings that it not be allowed to do so. 61 The I.C.J. affirmed in the Corfu
Channel case 62 that, under the U.N. Charter, every state has an obliga-
tion "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to
59. Commentators cite (often incorrectly) the Caroline case for the customary norm. See,
eg., Waldock, supra note 49, at 462-64; Tiinnermann, supra note 1, at 129-30. Both overlook
the fact that the Caroline case involved anticipatory self-defense. See M. McDOUGAL & F.
FELICIANO, supra note 50, at 218. Any act of self-defense, of course, to a greater or lesser
degree, anticipates what others are likely to do. To borrow an example from personal self-
defense, we anticipate that the fellow who shoots at us will do so again if given the opportu-
nity, and we seek to deprive him of that opportunity by firing back before he can get off that
next shot. We anticipate otherwise at peril of our lives. The same analysis applies to situations
involving the use of force by one state against another. Under the U.N. Charter, an action
taken in response must be directed at preventing or deterring anticipated further unlawful uses
of force.
The Caroline case involved the following facts. In 1837, a rebellion against the Royal Gov-
ernment of Canada occurred. An armed band of New Yorkers prepared to carry "supplies
and military stores from the American side of the river to the rebels in Navy Island, part of
British territory." 2 J.B. MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 414 (1906). Warned
of this activity by the New Yorkers' public appeals for support, and determined to stop it,
British forces crossed the border, captured the Caroline, in which the supplies were shipped,
and sent it over Niagara Falls. Id. at 409. The Secretary of State summed up the United
States' view that the right to violate international borders in self-defense "should be confined to
cases in which the 'necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.'" Id. at 412. The Israeli attack at the
beginning of the Six Day War in June 1967 constitutes one of the clearest applications of the
Caroline standard.
Not surprisingly, those who seek to impeach the self-defense claim at issue most often in-
voke this test, since the "instinctive" need expressed by Webster hardly ever is encountered in
situations short of an outright invasion of one state by the armed forces of another, or direct
and ongoing conventional military action against its territory, vessels, aircraft, or personnel.
That one may fire back immediately when fired upon does not help much in evaluating use-of-
force instances as they actually arise in international affairs. To go further and say that one
may fire back only under those circumstances, and none other, is to advocate a view more
suited to domestic criminal law, where effective community peacekeeping institutions exist,
than to international law and relations.
60. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 30-31 (Judgment on Merits of Apr. 9);
Waldock, supra note 49, at 500-01.
61. See 6 J.B. MOORE, supra note 59, at 998-99 (Alabama claims arbitration).
62. (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment on Merits of Apr. 9).
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the rights of other States."'63 The Court held Albania liable for damages
to British warships that struck mines while exercising the right of inno-
cent passage through Albania's territorial waters.
A use of force may take various forms. A given use violates article
2(4) if it constitutes unilateral action to deprive forcibly the target state
of its legal rights. Thus, a state that arms, trains, supplies, or otherwise
supports regular or irregular armed forces conducting operations in or
against another state is responsible under international law for such oper-
ations. If such operations violate article 2(4), the target state may exer-
cise its right of self-defense against that state. Nothing in the Charter or
in customary international law commands that "armed attack" take a
particular form; similarly, there is no prohibition on particular forms of
self-defense so long as they are reasonably calculated to end the unlawful
use of force that triggered and justified the defensive use of force.
B. Defensive Uses of Force in Practice
The affirmation of legal rights conditions both the right to use force
and its exercise. In this context, the Caroline standard" is a formula
articulating the principle thit the use of force in self-defense must be
justified by a prior breach of international law of a forceful character.
Under article 2(4) of the Charter, such a breach means an attack on the
territorial integrity or political independence of another state. To be law-
ful, a responsive use of force under article 51 must aim to cure the breach
that gave rise to the exercise of the right of self-defense. It must be pro-
portional, involving no more than the force reasonably required to cure
the breach.65
Permissible uses of force in self-defense, aimed to achieve permissible
objectives, may take as many forms as the impermissible uses of force
giving rise to the claimed right to act in self-defense. At one extreme, the
removal of Napoleon (and, during World War II, of Hitler, had he not
committed suicide) became a necessary and proportional object of the
allied uses of force. In Napoleon's case, it was clear that his government
had consistently adopted a policy of aggression and that no peace treaty
could assure its good behavior. Similarly, any state that is a continuing
victim of Libya's terrorist attacks would have a strong case for a respon-
sive use of force under article 51; the removal of Qadhafi's government
63. Id. at 22.
64. See supra note 59; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 429 (The Caroline "test is primarily
verbal: it deals with a question of degree and in fact merely states that governments should
exercise their discretion to act in defence of their vital interests with caution.").
65. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICiANO, supra note 50, at 242.
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may be the only way to end Libya's use of terrorist attacks against such
states and their citizens in violation of article 2(4). Certainly, the present
Libyan government has failed to change its policies when confronted by
diplomatic exhortation and economic pressure.
These examples constitute extreme cases. A responsive, defensive use
of force ought to reflect only what is necessary to end the violation of
international law that gave rise to the right to use force in self-defense.
Thus, support for the FSLN's opponents is a proportional use of force in
self-defense, designed to encourage the Sandinistas to cease supporting
guerrillas fighting Nicaragua's neighbors-that is, to end Nicaragua's
persistent and sustained violation of international law.66 Equally, mining
Nicaragua's harbors in 1984, which caused such controversy and figures
so prominently in Nicaragua's I.C.J. case against the United States and
in Ambassador Tiinnermann's article, 67 constituted a proportional re-
sponse to Nicaragua's supplying arms and other mat6riel to Central
American guerrillas by aiming to deprive Nicaragua of its sources of
these supplies. Contrary to Ambassador Tiinnermann's suggestions,68
President Reagan has often declared that American policy aims to end
Nicaragua's support of guerrillas in other countries, not to overturn the
FSLN government. 69
C. Necessity for Defensive Use of Force
The question of the justification for a defensive use of force dominates
scholarly consideration of article 51 of the U.N. Charter as it did schol-
arly consideration of the customary law-the substance of article 51. 70
Ambassador Tiinnermann asserts that, since 1982, the United States has
66. See Moore, supra note 9, at 87-90 (use of paramilitary forces as part of defensive re-
sponse lawful). But see Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on
the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621 (1985) (Nicaragua not
aggressor under international law, id. at 660; direct attack by Nicaragua against El Salvador
cannot be fully substantiated, id. at 661; U.S. restrained by international law from intervening
in Nicaraguan affairs, id. at 663).
67. See, e.g., Application, supra note 2; Memorial, supra note 1, at 43-48; Tiinnermann,
supra note 1, at 109.
68. Tiinnermann, supra note 1, at 130.
69. See, e.g., Central America, Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress,
19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 608-11 (Apr. 27, 1983) ("[L]et us be clear as to the American
attitude toward the Government of Nicaragua. We do not seek its overthrow. Our interest is
to ensure that it does not infect its neighbors through the export of subversion and violence.
Our purpose, in conformity with American and international law, is to prevent the flow of
arms to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. We have attempted to have a
dialogue with the government of Nicaragua, but it persists in its efforts to spread violence.")
70. See generally M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 50, at 229-41; D. BowErr,
supra note 55, at 10; Waldock, supra note 49, at 495-99; J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
406-07 (6th ed. 1963).
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used force against the political independence of Nicaragua, and that "[i]n
no sense can [this] use of force .. .be regarded as the only available
means of protecting essential rights from irreparable harm. ' 71 This as-
sertion requires analysis. Under article 51, the "target-claimant" 72 must
evaluate the coercive pressures attacking its legal rights and decide if it
should exercise its inherent right of self-defense to affirm the legal rights
attacked. In Central America, El Salvador and other neighbors of Nica-
ragua are "under the pressure of an effective armed attack. . . and [are]
threatened in [their] territorial integrity, in [their] sovereignty, and in
[their] independence." 73 The U.N. Charter recognizes that states have
the legal right to enjoy territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political in-
dependence as attributes of sovereign equality. Effective enjoyment of
this right is a necessary predicate to world public order in a system of
states.74
Article 2(4) of the Charter requires a good faith effort to seek a peace-
ful resolution of the conflict in light of all the circumstances of the case
before a state being attacked uses force in self-defense. The test is a prac-
tical one, not one of ritual punctilio. Under article 51, the judgment of
the state being attacked is final, unless and until the Security Council
takes measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
However subjective, self-defense represents an effort to end significant
violations of international law and to prevent their recurrence. These
goals discipline the use of force in self-defense. They do not qualify the
right to act, for only the Security Council may do so. Rather, they estab-
lish criteria for determining what kind of action is permissible.
Exhaustion of alternative forms of dispute resolution thus is not a pre-
requisite to using force in self-defense. Nicaragua's neighbors and the
United States, while acting under article 51, nonetheless have tried alter-
natives to the use of force to counter Nicaragua's support for, and en-
couragement of, guerrillas in El Salvador and Honduras. Since 1981,
Latin American states and the United States have pressed Nicaragua to
agree to a comprehensive, regional framework for addressing what all
participants agree are interrelated political, economic, social, and mili-
tary problems. Since 1983, the Contadora negotiations conducted under
71. Tiinnermarm, supra note 1, at 129. This statement implicitly admits that Nicaragua
irreparably harms its neighbors' "essential rights."
72. M. McDouGAL & F. FELicIAo, supra note 50, at 230.
73. Declaration of Intervention by the Republic of El Salvador (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
Pleadings (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua) (Declaration dated
Aug. 15, 1984).
74. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 (sovereign equality); art. 2, para. 4 (territorial integ-
rity and political independence).
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the auspices of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela have gener-
ated a program for resolving the region's problems, but, as of June 1986,
no agreement on implementing it. The United States regards itself as
committed to "abide by a comprehensive, verifiable and simultaneous im-
plementation of the Contadora Document of Objectives of September
1983, as long as such agreement is being fully respected by all the
parties." 75
So long as Nicaragua continues to support insurgencies in other Cen-
tral American countries, responsive uses of force in self-defense remain
lawful under article 51. What Ambassador Tiinnermann means by sug-
gesting that there are other options available to the United States is un-
clear. Certainly, Nicaragua has proved unwilling'to meet the United
States' concerns expressed in negotiations with the Sandinistas as well as
in public statements. 76
D. The United States and Nicaragua: Collective Self-Defense
Ambassador Tiinnermann entertains his readers with a canard:
If the United States refused to regard the Soviet placement of missiles in
Cuba-nuclear warheads aimed directly at its territory-as an armed at-
tack, the actions charged against Nicaragua must fall far below the require-
ment of Article 51. They do not involve the use of armed forces.
Nicaraguan troops and other forces under its direction and control are not
alleged to be operating outside its borders. It is not even asserted that Nica-
ragua is "substantially involved" in the rebel operations in El Salvador. All
that the United States has alleged-without producing a shred of proof-is
that Nicaragua has provided some conventional arms to the insurgents.77
75. Letter from Ambassador Philip C. Habib to Congressmen Barnes, Richardson, and
Slatterly (Apr. 11, 1986) (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law). On Sep-
tember 9, 1983, all five Central American states agreed to a 21-point Document of Objectives,
which included proposals both to terminate all subversion, terrorism, or sabotage, and to es-
tablish "machinery necessary to formalize and develop the objectives contained in this docu-
ment, and to bring about the establishment of appropriate verification and monitoring
systems." REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 5, at 27 n.41. For a detailed
account of diplomatic efforts to resolve Central American problems through direct U.S.-Nica-
raguan negotiations in 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 through the Manzanillo talks, among
others, see id. at 23. See also Wash. Post, May 11, 1986, at A4, col. I (details of possible
scheme for verifying Central American agreement).
76. See generally REvOLrriON BEYOND OUT BORDERS, supra note 5.
77. Tiinnermann, supra note 1, at 135. Ambassador Tiinnermann relies on assertions by
Professor Abram Chayes that the quarantine of Cuba in 1962 was not undertaken under article
51. Professor Chayes was the Legal Adviser at the time and his opinion is relevant evidence,
not authoritative. In any event, the United States was, and is, not bound by Professor Chayes'
legal opinioni. The United States' actions with regard to the Cuban Missile Crisis must have
been based on article 51; nothing else will justify them as a matter of law. Professor Chayes is




This straw man, that the issue concerns Nicaraguan attacks against the
United States, warrants examination only because Ambassador
Tiinnermann raises it. The United States has never claimed that Nicara-
gua is attacking the United States. It has claimed that Nicaragua is at-
tacking El Salvador and Honduras, and that the United States has the
inherent right to act to end such attacks, which constitute aggression.
A number of commentators assert that article 51's reference to the
inherent right of collective self-defense presents semantic difficulties.78
Article 51 does contain ambiguities. In this respect, it is not unique
among legal documents. Those ambiguities are reconciled if the article is
read in context and in the perspective of its policy goals. In addition to
the fact that the drafters of article 51 contemplated the existence of re-
gional security treaties and intended that the U.N. Charter allow them,79
other compelling reasons argue for construing article 51 to encompass
the full range of customary international law exising before the time of
the U.N. Charter and to permit arrangements of collective self-defense
like those of NATO and the other American security treaties.8 0 The fail-
ure of the Security Council as an effective peacekeeping institution un-
derlines the importance of such a construction.81
When a group of states acts to counter a violation of article 2(4), it
provides an alternative framework for achieving the fundamental pur-
pose of the Charter and any other legal system: "the prevention and
means by "shred of proof." Abundant evidence exists concerning Nicaragua's active involve-
ment with guerrilla movements in Central America. Perhaps he means evidence, of which
there is a substantial quantity, that would be admissible in federal court.
78. See, e.g., D. BowETr, supra note 55, at 200-48 (advocates restrictive view of collective
self-defense; rights flow to individual states rather than groups, and states may exercise their
individual rights collectively); H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 913-15 (1951)
(collective self-defense means one state's assisting another exercising its right of self-defense);
M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 50, at 247-50 (criticism of Bowett, Kelsen, Stone,
and others; groups may have rights and can exercise self-defense; collective self-defense is one
modality of permissible coercion); J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CON-
FLICT 245 (1954) (one state has no right of self-defense arising out of an attack on another);
Waldock, supra note 49, at 503-05 (collective self-defense predicated on right of individual self-
defense). See also Joyner & Grimaldi, supra note 66, at 665-67 (U.S. must invoke Rio Treaty
for its actions in Central America to qualify as exercise of right of collective self-defense).
79. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
80. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 50, at 250.
81. The Charter permits regional security arrangements. These arrangements must, how-
ever, express values that conform to the Charter's articulations of universal values. Thus arti-
cle 52 provides, in part:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace
and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
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suppression of unilateral change by destructive coercion.18 2 As with uses
of force in individual self-defense, such uses of forces must be propor-
tional; that is, reasonably calculated to achieve the goals of a lawful use
of force. Just as the Security Council may review claims of individual
self-defense, it may review self-defense claims asserted by a group.
Neither article 51 nor the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist-
ance purports to require third party approval before a state may exercise
its right to act in individual or collective self-defense. 83
By casting the issue in terms of a mythical, direct Nicaraguan armed
attack against the United States and denying and ignoring the evidence
of his government's assistance to guerrillas fighting the governments of
El Salvador and Honduras, Ambassador Tiinnermann dodges a reality
even critics of the Administration's Central American policies recog-
nize.84 By doctoring the record, Ambassador Tiinnermann seeks to cre-
ate the impression that Nicaraguan actions conform to the law they
violate.
Nicaraguan policy challenges the most important U.N. Charter rules
regarding world public order. Nicaraguan support for guerrillas in
neighboring states constitutes a unilateral attempt to impose change by
the use of force on the ground that a Socialist government has the right
under international law to propagate its principles by the sword. That
Nicaragua deploys far larger forces than either of its immediate neigh-
bors8 5 increases the threat posed by guerrillas operating with Nicaraguan
82. M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 50, at 250.
83. Joyner & Grimaldi, supra note 66, at 665, assert that the United States must invoke the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) in order to exercise its right of
collective self-defense in the hemisphere. Moore, supra note 9, at 104-05, notes that they mis-
read the Treaty and misunderstand the notion of collective self-defense. See also id. at 90-91
(United States has not violated Charter of Organization of American States). Both the Rio
Treaty and the OAS Charter provide that armed attack against one state-party shall be consid-
ered an armed attack against every other American state. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (Rio Treaty), Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3(1), 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S.
77; OAS CHARTER, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 27, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3,
as amended, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847.
84. See, eg., Foley, Contra.Aid: An Act of War, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986, at A17, col. 2
(Foley mentions Nicaraguan assistance to guerrillas in passing, although referring to such
assistance weakens his own argument). See also HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON IN-
TELLIGENCE, REPORT ON AMENDMBNT TO THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1983, H.R. REP. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Boland Committee
Report hostile to Administration policy while recognizing that Nicaragua commits aggression
against its neighbors).
85. Since 1979, Nicaragua has built a substantial military machine. Whereas Somoza
deployed fewer than 15,000 troops, the Sandinistas now boast a regular military establishment
of some 62,000 active duty forces. With reserves, militia, and security forces, the total is at
least 119,000, Its forces are equipped with advanced Soviet weapons superior in quantity and
quality to those possessed by its neighbors. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & U.S. DEP'T




support. For example, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica together
lack the power to force Nicaragua to change its policy.86 The United
States alone has sufficient power either to bring an end to Nicaraguan
violations of the international law regarding the use of force or to project
a protective screen over the targets of Nicaraguan policy.
III. The Nicaraguan Challenge
The Nicaraguan problem is deceptively simple. At one level, it con-
cerns contrasting descriptions of events in Central America. Nicaragua
claims to be the victim of unlawful armed attack by the United States
and its surrogates dating from early 1982. The United States asserts that,
on the contrary, since 1979, Nicaragua has engaged in armed attacks
against its neighbors by supporting, arming, training, and directing like-
minded guerrillas fighting the governments of El Salvador and Hondu-
ras. American support for resistance to Sandinista policies responds to
Nicaragua's unlawful use of force. Therefore, the United States' policy is
consistent with the U.N. Charter's affirmation of the right to engage in
collective self-defense. On a more fundamental level, however, the Nica-
raguan problem is part of a broader, unresolved conflict about the appro-
priate rules of world public order.
The U.N. General Assembly's adoption in 1974 of a Definition of Ag-
gression 87 provides one example of this conflict. The General Assembly
adopted the definition by consensus; there was no rol-call. Article 7 of
the Definition provides:
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3 [invasion, bombard-
ment, blockade, attack by armed forces, sending armed bands, allowing ter-
ritory to be used by a second State to commit aggression against a third
State, may qualify as aggression], could in any way prejudice the right to
self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter,
of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
MILITARY BUILD-UP (1985). Costa Rica deploys essentially constabulary forces totalling
8,000 troops; Honduras has 18,000 troops. The disparities in equipment mirror those in num-
bers. Id. at 37.
86. See id.; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BAL-
ANCE 1983-1984, at 110-12 (1984) (El Salvador's armed forces totaled 24,650 and were being
increased).
87. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Definition of Aggression]. See generally J. STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH
CONSENSUS (1977); Tyner, Wars of National Liberation in Africa and Palestine: Self-Determi-
nation for Peoples or for Territories?, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 234 (1979). Ambassa-
dor Tiinnermann cites the Definition of Aggression to bolster his description of the law. See
Tiinnermann, supra note 1, at 117-18.
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operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms
of alien domination; nor to the right of these peoples to struggle to that end
and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the
Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.88
The debates about the meaning and application of this article revealed
profound disagreement about the commanding force of article 2(4) in
circumstances analogous to those existing in Central America. 9 For ex-
ample, the East German delegate asserted, probably with unconscious
irony:
As colonial rule, apartheid and other forms of alien suppression constituted
a permanent aggression against the oppressed peoples, resistance against
those forms of external use of force and suppression was an act of self-
defense. Any assistance, political or material, to those struggling for inde-
pendence and self-determination was therefore in full conformity with the
Charter and other documents of the United Nations .... 90
Most Soviet bloc delegates carefully distinguished struggles against colo-
nial oppression from "police actions" within other states.91 The Chinese
delegate agreed that article 7's reference to outside support included
armed support, particularly against Israel. 92 Delegates from NATO and
other Western countries argued that article 7 did not legitimate armed
force and that the U.N. Charter's rules regarding the use of force clari-
fied its meaning; they were a distinct minority among those who spoke.93
These efforts to reconcile the conflicting goals of the Definition of Ag-
gression have failed both as a matter of logic and in the realm of state
practice. No one has succeeded in explaining how the law can tolerate
armed attacks against disfavored states and prohibit them against all
states. 9
4
The debates over the meaning of article 7 revealed at least nominal
disagreement about the meaning and application of article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter. This disagreement is integral to the Nicaraguan dispute.
Given the contrary evidence, the denials by Ambassador Tfinnermann
88. Definition of Aggression, supra note 87, art. 7.
89. Indeed, Nicaragua claims the right to support liberation movements in the Caribbean
area. See supra text accompanying note 20 & note 32.
90. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1476th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doe. A/C.6/SR.1476 (1974) (italics in
original).
91. J. STONE, supra note 87, at 85.
92. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1475th mtg.) at 62, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1475 (1974). The
Chinese delegate also criticized the Soviet Union for committing aggression in 1968 when it
invaded Czechoslovakia. Id. See generally J. STONE, supra note 87, at 85.
93. See generally J. STONE, supra note 87, at 81-85.
94. U.N. practice when confronted by civil strife illuminates the problem. See generally




and other Nicaraguan officials that Nicaragua has ever supported insur-
rection in other Central American states, or that, even if Nicaragua sup-
ports insurrections abroad, that such support does not violate
international law,95 suggest that the Sandinistas regard such support as
lawful, although they deny that it is so when directed against the FSLN.
Few states are free from demands by people claiming to be oppressed.
In Europe, for example, various ethnic groups have long asserted such
claims. To suggest that the existence of an insurrection liberates states
from their obligations to refrain from the use or threat of force and al-
lows them to provide armed support to the insurrection stands the Char-
ter on its head and is a prescription for anarchy. If this view becomes
part of the international law governing the use of force, no state will be
safe, and the risk of general war will increase.
Conclusion
The debate about the law regarding the use of force reflected in state
practice ought, in a rational world, to be resolved in favor of reciprocal
respect for article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. That a substantial number of
states disposing of great power appear not to want this outcome threat-
ens world public order.
Public order cannot survive on a double standard. If violations of arti-
cle 2(4), such as Nicaragua's with respect to El Salvador, Honduras, and
Costa Rica,96 become evidence of what the law is, the law will disappear.
Sauve qui peut will become the order of the day. At a minimum, the
states that are attacked may defend themselves by adopting the methods
of their attackers. Such a course of events would lower the threshold for
general war. In a nuclear world, if states are to avoid war, they must
insist on reciprocal respect for the U.N. Charter's commands regarding
the use of force. No other rules make sense for a system of states, and
there is no alternative policy if peace is to be preserved. The rules of
articles 2(4) and 51 correspond to the necessities of the state system if it
is to be a system of international cooperation and not of anarchy.
95. Tiinnermann, supra note 1, at 135.
96. See supra note 38.
